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Abstract.  Water sharing has become a serious 
problem in France. One of the objectives of 1992 
and 2000 directives proposed by the European 
Union was to reduce both the frequency and the 
extent of water conflicts through the 
establishment of multilateral negotiations, where 
different public and private interests can be 
represented in a structured institutional 
environment. In France, many negotiations  take 
place at local level between farmers, water 
suppliers, public services and environmentalists 
to allocate water resources between users. We 
suggest that Agent–Based Modelling (ABM) 
using a multi-agent approach could help 
negotiations between different players by 
showing the consequences of water allocation 
rules and taking in consideration the players’ 
respective attitudes and their ability to change 
their behaviour.  
Keywords.  Multiagent-based simulation, user 
and agent modelling, conflict resolution and 
negotiation, irrigation application. 
 
 
1.  INTRODUCTION 
 
The water directive introduced by the European 
Union in 2000 reinforces the institutional and 
legal aspects of the 1992 water directive to 
encourage public participation in water 
distribution for big hydrographical areas. One of 
the objectives of these different laws is to reduce 
the frequency and extent of water conflicts 
through the establishment of multilateral 
negotiations, where different public and private 
interests can be represented in a structured 
institutional environment.  
The aim of these negotiations is to reach a 
compromise that will improve the situation of 
some people of the parties with the agreement of  
the others. But few are in position to negotiate, 
notably because of the lack of tools and methods 
necessary to collectively assess the impact of the 
different scenarios and to organise the 
negotiation. In France, farmers irrigate land more 
and more in order to increase income and security 
and water sharing has become a serious problem.  
At a global level, the public authorities define 
principles governing water management. At a 
local level, regulations result from negotiations 
between farmers, water suppliers, public services 
and environmentalists. The results obtained are 
very complex, are more often not a reflection of 
the power struggle between the different parties 
and no attention is paid to the consequences of 
the different regulations. When the rule is very 
complex, it is difficult to say what the future 
revenue and water consumption of the farmers 
will be. In some cases tools from economic 
theory have been used. To define prices, quotas 
and regulations different approaches have already 
been used. Models based on linear programming 
and/or game theory have shown the interest of 
such approaches. The first part of this paper 
presents the models which have been used in 
irrigation. It goes on with a rapid review of 
decision theory before introducing in the second 
part the Agent-Based Modelling (ABM) system 
under construction and its initial results.  
  
2.  EXISTING MODELS  
 
2.1. Linear programming approaches  
 
Concerning irrigation, several applications have 
been developed in France concerning 
groundwater use in the Beauce region [12] or e 
water use of the Charente River [20], for 
example. In both models, the authors maximised 
a global utility function and used shadow prices 
to determine quotas or water prices. But taking    
irrigation issues into account raises specific 
limitations: 
-  Most coefficients of the economic function 
represent a crop margin, which depends on yields 
and prices. These coefficients are random and 
often the authors maximise the expected margin. 
Some applications try to maximise an expected 
income with a limited level of risk.  
-  Water availability and crop water needs are 
random variables.  
-  Not all decisions are taken at the same time; 
some are related to complementary information. 
For example a farmer decides to sow without 
knowing what the climate will be and he will 
irrigate according to the rainfall. 
 
2.2.  Game theory approaches  
 
The aim of game theory [16][18] is to 
formalise the agent decision-making process in a 
context where each agent tries to optimise its own 
utility function with respect to the other agents. 
One of its main outcomes is the emergence of 
equilibrium states, i.e. situations where no agent 
has an interest to diverge. Game theory models 
provide some valid models at economic level and 
in different social situations with few players 
[13].  
An application was implemented in the Adour 
Basin where, in order to estimate farmers’ 
income, the authors [27] used a linear program to 
determine income according to water price and 
allocated amounts of water. In the case of the 
Farmer agent, this linear function was 
transformed into a concave decreasing function 
(increasing the allocated water amount function 
and decreasing the water price function). On the 
contrary, the utility function of the 
Environmentalist agent is related to river flow. 
For the Taxpayer agent the utility function is a 
decreasing function of hydraulic investment.  
This type of model is built with a very strong 
hypothesis: 
  Quantification of political weight for each 
player.   
  Determination of (concave and continuous) 
utility function for each player.   
  Instability of the solutions, which require 
numerous repetitions to get stable results. 
 
2.3. Comments based on these two approaches   
 
-  These models are somewhat limited because 
they only take into account a few decision-
makers [13] and are often monoperiodic. 
-  They assume perfect knowledge of possible 
solutions and their consequences.  
-  These different approaches don't take time into 
account and take only one collective criterion as a 
basis.   
-  These models do not take the evolution of 
production systems into account, nor do they 
consider the different player learning processes.   
-  Both assume that the decision-maker is acting 
completely rationally. 
-  In the second approach, the representation of 
agents as constrained maximising algorithms 
restricts the density of the network of agent 
interactions as underlined by Moss [13] in a 
recent publication where he describes current 
practice in game theory literature. 
 
2.4. Agent-Based Modelling 
 
In opposition to the above mentioned 
approaches we think that Agent-Based 
Modelling, where simulations are based on multi-
agent systems, provides new solutions [8][13][15] 
that is to say: 
-  Takes into account many agents with different 
behaviours. 
-  Enables agents to learn and to change their 
behaviour in the light of new information. 
-  Simulates agent evolution over a long period 
in term of growth and bankruptcy.  
-  Considers alliances and lobbies linked to 
exchanges between agents. 
  We do not intend to provide the optimal 
solution but only to show real negotiators the 
possible consequences of the water allocation 
rules they have decided, according to different 
criteria: economic (global output), ethical 
(disparities between agents), environmental 
(water savings). (Figure 1)    










3.  OBJECTIVES 
 
The objective is to show over a number of 
years the evolution of a group of farmers who use 
a limited water resource. This resource is 
managed by a water supplier who allocates water 
to each farmer in accordance to the regulations. 
The amount of water consumed depends on the 
climate of the year, the irrigated area and the 
level of irrigation. The crop yields are related to 
rainfall and water allocation. We considered that 
the actors of the water allocation process are the 
following: 
-  The farmers: each of them has cash money, 
order on crop preferences, objectives and an 
attitude towards risk. He has a crop area divided 
into plots and his own irrigation capacity. Each 
year he decides his cropping plan, which must 
respect his crop preferences and agronomic rules. 
This order is partially related to crop yield, which 
depends on the climate of the year (unknown 
when he takes his decision) and on the water 
available. Possibly at this time he could negotiate 
with the water supplier for the water he needs. At 
the end of the year, after his economic results, 
each farmer can modify his crop preferences and 
decide whether or not to invest in more irrigation 
capacities. 
-  The water supplier: each year he has an 
amount of water that he allocates to the different 
farmers. He has expenses and must balance his 
accounts. 
-  The information supplier: each year he 
receives the individual farmers’ economic results, 
analyses and classifies them and sends a global 
report to each farmer. 
4.  MODEL DESCRIPTION 
After this short description of the actors
(1), we 
will transform them into agents. By agents we 
mean entities that are autonomous loci of 
decision-making: they decide and act [8][15]. A 
Multi-Agent System is composed of a set of 
computer procedures [10][15][28] where several 
agents share the same resource, limited or not, 
and communicate with each other. The current 
model is a generic one and does not correspond to 
a local situation. We have tried to Keep It as 
Simple as Suitable (KISS) using Axelrod's 
principle [1] as reformulated by Conte [5].  
Our modelling approach takes into account 
two types of agents (Table 1): 
•  Cognitive agents: generally speaking they 
follow a Perception-Decision- Action cycle 
[2][22][28][30]. 
•  Reactive agents: they are represented much 
more simply than the cognitive agents are but 
they are also more numerous and active [9]. 
These agents have inherited artificial life. They 
follow a Perception-Action cycle [10][29][30]. 
In the model, the cognitive agents (farmers, 
water supplier) are composed of knowledge, 
strategies, information memory and 
communication modules. They have to take 
decisions, so they must be rational [17] and the 
model builder has to choose which type of 
rationality. Roughly speaking there are three 
possible types of rationality as defined by 
Decision-Making Theory [21]: substantial [19] 
[29], bounded [25] and adaptive [6].  
 
 
 (1)  [3] " It is right to distinguish between a data 
processing agent and an economic agent although 
one can build data processing agents representing 
some economic agents. " Hereafter we will use 
the term agents for computer entities and actors 
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Table 1. Agents in the model developed. 
Agents Number  Type 
Farmers n  Cognitive 




Crops n  Reactive 
Climate 1  Reactive 
 
Some authors suggest that agents have 
substantial rationality, so they try to reach an 
optimum and they are endowed with optimisation 
skills. We think it would be more realistic, 
following the criticisms levelled by Simon [26] 
and Cyert and March [6], to endow our agents 
with a bounded and adaptive rationality.  
 
The structure of reactive agents (crops, 
climate) is only made up of knowledge and 
communication modules.  
Let us now examine the main components of a 
cognitive agent (farmer agent) and a reactive 
agent (climate agent). 
 
4.1. A cognitive agent model 
 
This type of agents is composed of four modules: 
a knowledge module, a strategy module, a 
communication module and a memory module. In 
our system, farmer agents are represented as 
cognitive agents.  
1. The knowledge module is divided into three 
parts: 
- A database containing data including farm area, 
crops classified in order of preference based upon 
profitability and water consumption. 
- A database containing calculation procedures 
for water requirements, crop yields related to 
rainfall and water allocation, for example. 
- A database containing decision-making 
procedures made up of a set of production rules 
to determine cropping plan, irrigated crops, water 
amount, among others. 
 
2. The strategy module, corresponding to a set of 
rules to enable each farmer agent to reach its own 
goal. 
Since these agents have different objectives, such 
as increasing or not their revenue and their 
security level, the strategy module contains rules 
which can evolve over time with respect to new 
information and better knowledge of other agent 
behaviours. The agents decide how to negotiate, 
what crop yield objective should be reached 
according to climate conditions, and the 
minimum cash level to be invested. 
3. Two communication modules  in accordance 
with the type of information exchanged: the 
private information module and public 
information module. 
- Private information is processed via a mailbox 
and messages. Each agent can send a message to 
the mailbox of a receiver, which has the means to 
process it. In the same way, it can receive a 
message in its personal mailbox and process it. 
This technique is used by farmer agents in their 
relation to the water supplier agent and 
information supplier agent. 
- Public information exchange is a technique 
where an agent sends public or semi-public 
information. This information can be processed 
by agents which have the method to retrieve it.  
For instance, the climate agent sends public 
information about the climate of the year which is 
used by the farmer agent to calculate crop yields. 
4. A memory module, which is a record of 
information exchanged with other agents. 
 
4.2. A reactive agent model  
 
This type of agents is composed of two modules: 
a knowledge module and a communication 
module. In our system, the climate agent is 
represented as a reactive agent. 
1.  The knowledge module is divided into two 
parts:  
- A database, containing individual information 
on each agent. 
- A database containing calculation procedures.  
For instance the climate contains the probability 
of different types of weather (Wet, Dry, Very 
Dry) and a function to select randomly the type of 
weather for a given year. The type of weather 
allows the crop agent to select which water 
answer curve to use (figure 2). The crop agent 
communicates its choice publicly to the farmer    
agents, which calculates its yield in function of 
the water used. 




















2.  Communication module where there is a 
method to send public information 
 
5.  MODEL IMPLEMENTATION 
 
The general structure is composed of classes, 
attributes and methods as presented in the UML 























This is a discrete event simulator [11], which 
is a sequential process of unrelated events. The 
simulation is carried out over a number of years 
(12), each of which is made up of four sequences.   
5.1.  Determination of the cropping plan 
 
Each farmer agent determines its cropping plan 
and its water needs. This is an iterative 
procedure: a farmer agent determines a first 
cropping plan, fixes its yield objectives for a 
climatic type of year according to its behaviour 
and calculates its global water needs. This request 
is made at a time when neither the climate of the 
year nor the other water requests are known.  
The water supplier agent receives a set of water 
requests, adds them up and proposes an amount 
of water to each farmer agent in accordance with 










































W ater S upplier
W aterFree : float*
W aterIni : float*
W aterEnd : float*
W aterAllocated : float*









TypeFarmer : i nt
N bP lot : int
A rea : float
Irrigant : bool*
W aterN eed : float*
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YieldM inW et : float
YieldM axW et : float
YieldM inD ry : float
YieldMaxDry : float
YieldM inV eryD ry : float
YieldM axVeryD ry : float
W aterNeedDry : float
W aterNeedVeryDry : float
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Yield    
Each farmer agent receives information about 
the amount allocated to it.  
These exchanges stop when the water supplier 
agent has no more water to allocate or no new 
requests. The water supplier agent determines its 
answer in accordance with the regulation tested. 
For the exchange between farmer agents and 
water supplier agent we have defined a protocol 
inspired by the MALE protocol described by Sian 
[24] (figure 4).  
 
5.2.  Climate determination and crop growth 
 
The climate of the year is determined at random. 
In accordance to the type of climate each crop 
agent has a method to select the water answer 
curve to use to calculate yields. 
 
5.3.  Economic results 
 
Each farmer agent calculates its yields and its 
economic results. It sends its results to the 
information supplier, which synthesises the 
information coming in from each farmer agent. 
The information supplier agent provides each 
farmer agent with global information concerning 
the highest, average and lowest revenues and crop 
yields. 
 
5.4.  Decision-making 
 
Each farmer agent decides whether or not to 
invest in more irrigation capacities and possibly 
to change its behaviour. 
6.  INITIALS TESTS AND PRELIMINARY 
RESULTS   
The model has been written in C++ under 
Builder5, the model interfaces are shown in the 
figure 7. We chose this tool because of the ease 
with which object classes can be defined, quality 
of the interfaces and the low runtime. The initial 
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Farmer agent procedure 




message   
-  Three types of climatic years: Wet, Dry and 
Very Dry. 
-  One hundred farmer agents with the same 
crops but with different areas. 
-  Water availability fixed at a level that is 
slightly above dry year needs.   
-  Water allocation rules. 
The model evolves progressively by following 
the analysis of results for each water allocation 
rule tested. The results can be examined from 
different points of view as shown in figure 5. 
 












In our model different types of rules are tested. 
Three of them are explained below: 
•  R1: Rule based on water requests pro rata: 
 
“If the amount of water requested is less than the 
water available, Then each farmer agent 
can use the amount of water requested.  
Else water is allocated in function of the request 
pro rata.” 
Two farmer agent behaviours have been 
considered: 
The first one (A) is greedy and selfish: the farmer 
agent asks for 120% of its water needs in very dry 
years.   
 
-  The other one (B) is reasonable: it only asks 
for its water needs in dry years.   
Figure 6 shows results using this rule. We can 
see that in the absence of reasonable farmer 
agents, global production is higher but 
heterogeneity of demands leads to great yield 
disparities. These results are paradoxical but can 
be explained as follows in: Increase 
heterogeneity of needs leads not only to a greater 
yield disparities but also to a global reduction in 
yield. This rule seems unsatisfactory both from 
the collective point of view and the ethical point 
of view. 
 
Figure 6: R Re es su ul lt ts s   o of f   s si im mu ul la at ti io on n: :   r ru ul le e   b ba as se ed d   o on n   
w wa at te er r    d de em ma an nd ds s    p pr ro o    r ra at ta a    w wi it th ho ou ut t    n ne eg go ot ti ia at ti io on n   




























•  R2: Rule based on crop areas irrigated: 
With this rule we obtained better results in the 
short run in terms of global production and 
disparities. The results are similar to those 
obtained with a rule based on a centralised 
economy. 
 
•  R3: Rule based on requests with better 
knowledge of the others: 
The farmer agent has an adaptive rule; it knows 
the water allocation of each farmer and asks for 
the maximum amount of water allocated. Results 
show that we get the same results as before after 
three years in this bottom-up evolution, based on 
better knowledge, as in the top-down way of 
fixing water allocation (rule R1). Other 
simulations have been done, for example to test 
Different point of view to examine results 
Individual point 
of view: 
Needs and water 
allocation per ha 
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w ater available w ater consumption w ater not used   
the possibility of decreasing disparities between 
small and big farmers through water allocation. 
These initial results have been discussed with 
professionals in order to validate the model: do 
they understand the model, do they understand 
the results from the model. After these first 
results, the model is under modification to now 
being modified in order to introduce long-term 
effect on crop area evolution, water use and of 
farmers “disappearance” for economic reasons. 
 
7.  VALIDATION 
 
Before improving this model we have to consider 
its validity or at least the methods needed to 
validate this type of model. The question of 
validation in a multi-agent approach is a real 
problem. Validation is not a procedure to test a 
scientific theory or to certify the truth of a 
scientist way of thinking but a means to decide if 
a model is acceptable with respect to its potential 
use. Validation is a demonstration of what a 
model (in its application domain) actually 
provides on a scale of satisfaction compared to 
the results we expected from the model. But how 
should we decide if a model is acceptable for its 
future use? How can we decide if a system is 
good or not in the light of its results?  
Researchers are not agree on validation methods. 
Following Rykiel [24] and Moss [14] two types 
of validation can be considered: 
- Operational validation: this is a protocol 
(statistical tests) that shows if the model output 
correspond to the model objectives. This is a 
comparison between simulated data and 
observation in the real world. If the context 
changes the model must be revaluate.  
- Conceptual validation which tests whether 
assumptions in the model are correct. 
There are moreover types of validation 
procedures proposed by different group of 
researcher [7] [17] [24]: 
- Face validity: it is a surface or initial impression 
of the realism of a model by a group of experts 
that know the domain.   
- Output comparison with other validated models. 
- Output statistical validity (T Test; KS test, 
Turing test). 
- Predictive power: testing and comparing the 
results of the model against reality. 
- Ease of the utilisation of the model. 
-  Flexibility of the model or how a model evolve 
with modifications. 
- Internal validation using a set of data we could 
test if the output are consistent step by step at a 
runtime. 
- Data validation. 
  Taking into account the proposals made by 
different group of researcher [7] [17] [24] we 
have been led to consider the following elements:   
- Data validation (input data, methods).   
- The ability of the model to answer questions 
(predictive power) that we formulate as follows:   
a.  Users’ understanding of the model (face 
validity). 
b.  Users’ understanding of the results of the 
model (called result confirmation).  
- The ability for users to use the model (ease of 
use).   
 
To satisfy the above requirements, we have 
designed the following experiments:   
- We first built a very simple generic model using 
general agronomic data that agronomists agreed 
about production functions.  We proposed this 
simple generic model to decision-makers. They 
understood quickly the principles of the model if 
we didn't insist on details of multi-agent 
modelling.   
- Then we presented the preliminary results to 
decision-makers. They accepted immediately. 
They were even considered to be merely stating 
the obvious and of no interest: of course, a rule 
based on water needs pro rata is going to give 
more water to farmers who ask for more. It is 
only after showing the different consequences (in 
terms of yield disparities and global production) 
of different behaviours that we see an increased 
interest on the part of the decision-makers; they 
imagine new water allocation rules and ask to see 
the consequences.  
- Finally, we got the following conclusion: we 
can get the same satisfactory results in terms of    
both collective interest and a reduction in 
disparities either in an authoritative way or in a 
decentralised way by providing more information 
to farmer agents. This conclusion corroborates 
the results of the economic theory.   
8.  CONCLUSIONS  
 
This paper shows an already operational system 
of Agent-Based Modelling which could be an 
element in the negotiation for water sharing. At 
this stage, the model developed is not a 
negotiation model. It intends only to present to 
the actors involved in the negotiation process the 
consequences of water allocation rules. The 
experience gained from the development effort of 
our model supports the proposition that agent-
based simulation is an appropriate modelling 
framework to test water allocation rules. First, 
Agent–Based Modelling is well adapted to 
modelling many types of agents with different 
rationalities. Second, environmental problems, 
which are very complex, may be modelled 
satisfactorily by distributed artificial intelligence. 
Third, multi-agent systems provide an adequate 
structure to represent multiple and complex 
interactions between cognitive agents (farmers 
and water supplier agents), which are composed 
by complex knowledge modules, and reactive 
agents (crops and climate agents) that have an 
important place in the global structure for water 
allocation.  
More research has to be done in several 
directions: (1) improvement and extension to 
other types of water resource (river and water 
table); (2) real world experiments to tell us if we 
should to keep it as a model to help negotiations 
or if we should develop it as a negotiation model, 
(3) improvement of the model by adding 
communication between farmer agents (conflict 
resolutions, grouping of farmer agents); (4) 
improvement of the water allocated model by 
introducing a variable time; (5) improvement of 
the model by integrated approaches of the multi-
agent community game theory.  
A question needs to be settled: is it necessary to 
stay at a generic model level or should we create 
a model representing a complex reality? In this 
case many field studies must be carried out and 
the problem of the typology of the players, their 
behaviours and their different relation networks 
and influence must not be forgotten.  On the 
contrary, a generic model, which doesn’t aim to 
draw fine distinctions, would allow us to take into 
account a great diversity of agents with different 
attitudes, based on game theory. A recent 
publication [4] shows us that extremely simple 
models devised by physicists would shed a new 
light on the old wealth-sharing problem as posed 
by Pareto a century ago.   
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